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It was May 1992; Jamilus Hussien, had been given 24-hour notice to report for duty to 
head the new airport task force that was the KL International Airport (KLIA). The 
Public Works Department engineer was overwhelmed.  
“I had managed million ringgit projects, but to be summoned overnight for a 
multi-billion ringgit project floored me….” 
The Government allocated one billion ringgit for initial start-up costs that included 
land acquisition for the replacement airport in Sepang. The responsibility was 
assigned to KL International Airport Berhad (KLIAB), a newly formed wholly 
government-owned entity under the Minister of Finance Incorporated and Jamilus 
Hussein as the Managing Director. The rest of the task force had similar directives, 
and were thrown into the deep end to evaluate a project that had no precedence in 
Malaysia. Normally this kind of project will take 10 to12 years. Apparently, the 
biggest challenge for KLIAB was the deadline. The urgency to have the airport built 
by 1998 required innovative strategies to manage the project. 
KLIAB: The Background  
Initially, the role of KLIAB was limited to project management, overseeing a 
consortium of Japanese and British consultants and contractors called the Anglo 
Japanese Airport Consortium, appointed to develop and construct the airport. A 
consortium of four companies was instructed by the Malaysian government to create a 
master plan for the new international airport. The Anglo-Japanese Airport Consortium 
(AJAC) comprised of Balfour Beatty, Trafalgar House, GEC Marconi and Marubeni 
Corporation. AJAC engaged several foreign and local experts including the practice 
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Arkitek Jururancang, led by Hj Esa Bin Hj Mohamed, an architect and master planner 
who later took on the role of the Chairman of AJAC (Kara, 2007).   
  
The Malaysian government and AJAC decided that the design architect for the main 
terminal  
– the primary element of the airport – should be selected through an international 
competition. One Japanese and four British architects were invited to submit 
proposals and presentations were held in London at the end of April 1992. Kisho 
Kurokawa’s concept of a ‘symbiosis between architecture and the forest’ secured the 




 August 1992, led by Jamilus, KLIAB group comprised senior 
government officials formed the task force called the KLIA Project Management 
Group. The multidisciplinary group from different government departments and 
agencies gathered in makeshift premises to pore over submissions made by the master 
plan consultants. They formed the nucleus of the task force that evolved to become 
the 400-strong KLIAB in 1992.  
 
It was a sharp learning curve for the task force, which first reviewed the KLIA 
Masterplan and then the Project Definition and Engineering Design Proposal (PEDP), 
both prepared by AJAC. The PEDP culminated in the Engineering Design Contract, 
which laid the foundation for the fast-track KLIA project by identifying core activities 
that must be carried out in advance for the new airport to meet its operational 
deadline. Subsequently, a fall-out with AJAC ended with KLIAB being thrust into the 
leading role of developing and building the thoroughly modern world class airport. 
From then on there was no turning back for the fledgling company entrusted to steer 
the fast-track airport project to successful completion within six years. 
Funding for the International Airport 
The decision to build the airport was made in 1991 and the Master Plan and 
Environmental Impact studies undertaken almost immediately. From then on, it was a 
case of all systems go, with diverse number of activities proceeding concurrently in 
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the fast-track infrastructure project that owed much of it success to the timely 
availability of funds. 
 
The opening day cost of the first phase of KLIA was estimated at RM9 billion 
to be spent over six years. The Government had allocated RM1 billion from the 
Federal budget for land acquisition, upgrading of roads to meet traffic requirements, 
water supply, consultancy fees and equity in KLIAB (RM200 million). The rest of the 
ringgit was to be raised from the private sector.  
 
Fortunately, the booming Malaysian economy helped, with the country 
averaging a high growth rate of 8% between 1991 and 1995. Given the strong support 
for the project from Federal Government (which provides necessary guarantees), there 
was overwhelming support from the domestic financial community. International 
funding was limited to a Japanese Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) that 
approved a loan for the part payment of the main terminal building, contact pier and 
the baggage handling system. Although the OECF provided for a 61.5 billion yen 
loan, KLIAB limited its borrowings to 29 billion yen due to unfavourable foreign 
exchange conditions. 
 
On hindsight, restricted foreign borrowings proved to be KLIAB’s single 
biggest blessing in the light of the fall of the ringgit in the economic crisis that swept 
through the region since mid 1997. It is also fortunate that the airport was nearing 
completion at the time of the economic slowdown that resulted in spiralling interest 
rates. KLIA was not affected by this. 
 
For the first two years, KLIAB obtained funds to meet its development 
expenditure from institutions such as the employees Provident Fund (EPF), Pensions 
Trust Fund, Social Security Organisation (SOCSO) and the Pilgrims Fund Board 
(Lembaga Tabung Haji). In 1995, bonds worth RM1.6 billion were issued by them 
and a RM 500 million revolving loan facility provided by Affin Discount Berhad. 
Another RM2.5 billion term loan was approved by the EPF in 1997. 
 
Meanwhile, in late 1995, the Federal government decided to include Islamic 













who readily welcomed the opportunity in a market characterised by a dearth of 
Islamic securities. The largest single of RM2.2 billion A-Bai Bithamaan Ajil (BBA) 
notes by Bank Islam in January 1996 was followed by another RM2.2 billion BBA 
notes in1997. Islamic funding utilised by the KLIA project is a world record. KLIAB 
also has the distinction of being the first company to float its Islamic notes on the 
Scripless Securities Trading System. 
Managing the project 
In managing mega projects, time is a luxury one could not afford. With time as 
one of the core objectives of a project, even a simple project may become more 
complex to deliver. For a mega project, the bigger the scale and size of the project the 
more complex the work processes gets and a slight delay in one component of the 
project will have an exponential knock-on effect to the other project components. 
Acknowledging the strategic significance of the airport to the Malaysian economy and 
the impending 1998 Commonwealth Games in Kuala Lumpur, KLIAB deemed 
necessary a sound procurement strategy that prioritised fast-track methods.  
 
The foundation for fast-tracking was laid by the Engineering Design Contract, 
and out of this grew the KLIA Master Implementation Programme, the cornerstone of 
the procurement strategy, for the full development of KLIA. Described as “one of the 
most difficult tasks that KLIAB had to perform in 1994”, the time-driven Master 
Implementation Programme organised all construction activities into a systematic 
framework of realistic timelines, with a target 1998 deadline. 
 
The KLIA project include of 6 general phases (Figure 1) that comprised of 
more than 100 facilities divided into eight distinct groups of construction packages: 
passenger terminal complex; runways and aprons; earthworks and drainage; perimeter 
roads; central terminal area; southern support area; air traffic services; and utilities. 




Eighteen consulting organizations were appointed to assist the KLIAB in managing 
the KLIA project. Even a little conflict between parties or delay in work resulted in 
tremendous negative impact to the whole project schedule and made the project co-
ordination and management more complex.   
 
KLIA’s procurement strategy revolved around a selective combination of fast 
track design-and-build and conventional fast-track methods. This strategy fitted well 
into yet another strategy that divided the entire project into three manageable 
graphical areas – passenger terminal complex, core facilities and privatised facilities. 
The work contracts were broken into packages according to their respective areas. 
Three types of contracts were awarded: 
- Fast track conventional tenders 
- Fast track design and build tenders 
- Conventional tenders 
For the fast-track design and build and conventional contracts, tenders were invited 
based on preliminary engineering and architectural designs, with enough information 
for contractors to tender. Successful contractors were then issued just-in-time working 
drawing during the construction stage. Competitive tendering and just-in-time fast 
tracking approach eventually saved KLIAB a great deal of time in getting contractors 
to begin work on site (Figure 2). 
Figure 2: KLIA Fast Track Implementation 
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The procurement and contract package distribution strategies (Figure 3) in turn 
created yet another challenge: interfacing between numerous work activities and 
contractual overlapping. In response, KLIAB developed an innovative management 
matrix that took into account the complex planning, monitoring and control functions 
of managing a project of this scale and pace. KLIAB had braved into uncharted 
territory, trailblazing an organisational management structure that created another first 
in Malaysian construction history. Jamilus Hussien, who was responsible for the 
planning, design and construction of the KLIA project said.   
‘In the development of KLIA project, the decision making process is the key, 
from bottom up and top down. How do you manage cost, time, quality, and 
information from top to bottom and bottom to top?  It is all about the money. 
Changing scope is money, technical requirement, time delay, the policy level is 
money level change.” 
“There must be change level meeting; the lowest level is the package level, then 
areas, then overall, then the policy level. The cycle can be daily, weekly or 
monthly to manage the information. Decisions were made according to the level. 
. From my experience almost 80% of problem were solved at package level, 
15% at area level and 5% overall before it goes to policy level’ 
The Four Managerial Levels of KLIA Bhd
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The management matrix was driven and controlled by inter-supporting project 
units and service units. The efficient and smooth flow of information between the 
executive levels, project and service units through a close-looped approach facilitated 
quick decision-making and conflict resolution. To optimise productivity of specialist 
skills, KLIAB’s organisational resources approach was to form a core team of highly 
experienced and committed professionals supported by external consultants. Local 
and foreign planning, design and supervisory consultants were engaged to provide 
relevant expertise and services. Together, they adapted existing or developed new 
management tools to monitor and control time, cost, quality, and more importantly, 
fostered a professional working culture and a unique spirit of partnership.  
The closed loop is a tool used to execute various project strategies 
implemented earlier on (Figure 4). It is also a communication tool, ensuring the clear 
and well-defined flow of information, which is critical in managing large scale 
project. 
 
Figure 4: Concept on Closed Loop Management Approach 
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The implementation of ISO 9000 
KLIA (Kuala Lumpur International Airport), which implemented ISO quality system 
right from the early period of the project.  It was a great challenge for the KLIA 
Construction Management Team to implement the ISO quality system in a large 
project, which involved nearly 150 major contracts with more than 110 major 
contractors and 1600 interfaces between participants.  According to Hakim (2000) the 
QMS plan implemented in the KLIA project was referred to as Project Quality Plan 
(PQP).  The critical quality elements were: 1) management responsibility; 2) quality 
planning; 3) resources management; 4) process control; 5) inspection and testing; 6) 
quality recording; 7) auditing; and 8) data analysis and report.   
 
KLIAB produced a detailed QMS (Quality Management System) including 
the PQP (Project Quality Plan) whilst all the supervisory consultants and the 
contractors produced their own quality plans and submitted to the KLIAB.  The 
elements contained in the quality plans were used as minimum requirements for the 
implementation of the QMS against which the consultants and the contractors were 
assessed for the extent of their conformance.    
  
At the initial stage of the construction phase, i.e. in 1995, the contractors were 
naïve on the implementation of the QMS. Most of the contractors did not submit the 
quality plan for KLIAB’s approval even though it was clearly indicated in the 
agreement. Without this key document it was impossible to implement the QMS.  
Some of the quality plans submitted were incomplete and therefore were not approved 
by KLIAB. Consequently, many works did not meet the Contracts and KLIAB’s 
requirements.  The consultants frequently issued the Non Conformance Requirements 
(NCR) to the contractors for the failure and non-compliance with the stipulated QMS 
procedures. For instance, in June 1995, the consultants issued eleven NCRs to the 
contractors due to their ignorance of the procedures and in November 1995, an 
average of thirty Notices of Deviation (NOD) was issued to the respective contractors.  
 
 In 1996, the contractors were becoming aware of the importance of QMS and 
started to give attention to relevant procedures.  Most of the contractors had submitted 
their comprehensive quality plans, and gained approval for the plan from KLIAB. At 
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this stage the contractors faced several challenges to materialise the quality 
requirements into reality.  The analysis of the contractors’ performance of this 
particular year shows that they were having difficulties to implement the QMS in 
practice. The NCR and NOD reports of the concerned year indicated that the several 
problems such as non-conformance with the quality plan procedures; the records of 
work were inconsistent with the work executed on site, and non-compliance with the 
stipulated specification still prevailed.  
 
In spite of the inconsistency, the efforts shown by the contractors to fulfil the 
quality requirements were regarded as a positive development as they began to learn 
and understand the needs of implementing the QMS. The main contributing factor to 
the improved performance of the contractors was the training offered by the KLIAB.  
To ensure the continuous improvement of the contractors’ performance, KLIAB 
worked and monitored the progress closely with the contractors. In 1997, the 
contractors’ performance was much better. They began to implement most of the 
quality plan procedures. There remained however several deficiencies to be remedied 
such as non-compliance to certain procedures, poor documentation on the 
implementation of certain procedures and a great number of NCRs. 
 
The contractors were continually learning the implementation of the QMS. 
They were undergoing a change process from the traditional methods of managing 
their construction works to an efficient and systematic way through the QMS. The 
contractors could not be blamed solely for the shortcomings as they had no prior 
experience in implementing the QMS and it was comparatively new as well to the 
construction industry in Malaysia. 
 
Similar to the contractors, the performance of the consultants was evaluated 
using the requirements contained in their approved quality plan. In the first half of 
1995, only one requirement was complied by the consultants; i.e. checking the 
contractors’ method statement and testing procedures. The consultants were 
inexperienced in implementing the QMS and had similar difficulties as the contractors 
in adopting a new system of supervising construction works. The consultants reacted 
positively however, to improve the situation. 
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 In the second half of 1995 they started to fulfil all the requirements by 
beginning to develop the procedures but as the construction work commenced, a lot of 
works were done without proper auditing and checking.  Auditing of the contractors’ 
work was inconsistent; as a result, construction works were not able to be efficiently 
evaluated to check for the conformance of the specified requirements. Documentation 
systems were not properly exercised including the critical activities such as 
procedures for testing materials, which resulted in difficulty in checking the reference 
and controlling the documents. The shortcomings of the consultants had a negative 
impact on the total implementation of the QMS.   
 
In 1997, the working culture of the consultants towards the QMS had changed 
significantly. Their works were in accordance with their quality plans. Auditing 
against the contractors’ works was undertaken properly. Despite the outstanding 
performance, there were some minor drawbacks such as poor documentation.  Even 
though these minor drawbacks were negligible but they were fairly important to 
consistently achieve high quality at work.  The key lesson is that it is imperative to 
train the consultants before they begin supervising the contractors’ works because 
they are the critical agents to ensure the success of the implementation of the QMS.  
 
As a leader of the project, the KLIAB produced its quality manual before the 
commencement of the construction phase. The elements contained in KLIAB’s 
quality plan were clear definition of the project; structure of the organisation; the 
responsibility of each management level; the process involved; necessary resources; 
implementation procedures; and methods to ensure implementation and project 
control. 
 
KLIAB had exercised all procedures stated in its quality plan, including 
documenting processes and procedures, auditing against the consultants, and verifying 
the audit done by the consultants against the contractors. Several faults, weaknesses 
and unnecessary procedures had been identified through this process and corrective 
measures were applied according to the procedures stated in the quality plan. To 
improve the performance of the parties, the KLIAB conducted training through a 
series of conferences, seminars, workshops and meetings. The purpose of the training 
was to educate the consultants and the contractors to appreciate the importance of the 
11 
 
QMS, to clarify their function and the responsibility, and to guide them towards 
effective ways of conducting audits.  The training given by KLIAB boosted the level 
of understanding of the consultants and the contractors on the implementation of the 
QMS and changed their working culture. 
Constructing the Project  
The choice of site for the airport reflected the perceived need for decentralisation to 
spread growth beyond Kuala Lumpur and the Klang Valley. Sepang was chosen after 
considering a total of eight sites, primarily because:  
 • It was a sparsely populated greenfield site  
• The relatively flat terrain met aeronautical requirements  
• It was 50 kilometres south from Kuala Lumpur (45 minutes by road)  
• It was strategically located in relation to high-growth areas  
• The cost of acquiring land and resettling local residents was minimal  
• It could serve as a catalyst for growth, with minimum adverse effect on the 
community and the environment 
Relocating Communities 
The site identified for KLIA comprised a few sleepy settlements lost amidst rolling 
hills of rubber and palm oil plantations. A small community of 85 orang asli 
(aborigines) families was living there. They were mainly smallholders cultivating 
rubber, durians and other tropical fruits on their 891-acre settlement. They had to be 
moved. However relocating communities is not easy. KLIAB sought the assistance of 
the Aborigines’ Affairs Department (Jabatan Hal Ehwal Orang Asli) to make their 
relocation as painless as possible. 
 
 To ensure that the orang asli would enjoy a better life in their new village, the 
Federal Government had to work through the traditional orang asli hierarchy and took 
several measures. They were compensated for their loss of land, with some families 
receiving up to RM100, 000. To help them spend their compensation wisely, the 
Aborigines; Affair Department conducted meetings (through their headman) on how 
to invest their money. 
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The new village was 20km away near Bukit Cheeding Estate. The community 
settled into their new kampung-style homes on a 1000-acre site in 1993. It is a more 
integrated set-up, with a school, canteen, a community centre, a surau and three shop 
lots. They received government guidance on how to manage business. Meanwhile, 
Government agriculture agencies such as FELCRA (Federal Land Consolidation and 
Rehabilitation Authority) stepped in with advice on palm oil cultivation in the newly 
acquired land. It also introduced the orang asli to hydroponics, by constructing a 
greenhouse to kick start the water-based food cultivation practice. 
 
Another 9900 acres of oil palm and rubber plantations also had to be acquired. 
The Federal Government bought, wholly or partly, four estates affected by the airport 
development: Sungai Labu, Lothian, Bute and Sepang. There were a few homes for 
labourers affected, and plantation owners either served them termination benefits or 
redeployed them. All up, approximately 120 workers were affected. Several used their 
termination benefits to buy subsidised low-cost homes in the nearby township of 
Bandar Baru Salak Tinggi. To meet their needs, an additional 165 double storey 
terrace homes were built in the township and an extension added to the local school. 
 
The estates and orang asli settlement accounted for approximately 10,700 
acres of land. The remaining area belonged to government agencies and a government 
forest reserve. It added up to 25,000 acres, the area allocated for KLIA. The Federal 
Government spent altogether RM375 million on land acquisition, compensation and 
resettlement. 
The Transient Workers 
Remote construction sites are notorious for hastily built slum settlements of kongsis 
mushrooming overnight. The crammed living quarters often supports more bodies per 
square meter than Wembley Stadium at the FA Cup final. Coupled with the fact they 
often do not have piped water, electricity and suffer from badly maintained communal 
facilities, they health hazards waiting to explode. Cross-culture interactions resulted in 
contradicting work culture, and language barrier posed many unavoidable problems.   
  
To overcome this problem, KLIAB set out to build a township on a 40-acre 
site at the edge of the airport where migrant workers could live and work close to the 
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33 work sites scattered across 25,000 acres. A well-planned town catering to the 
needs of the KLIA workforce, particularly, manual staff, was considered important in 
helping alleviate many of the social and health problems associated with kongsis and 
shanty towns the world over. The town was built in 1995. It provided housing, 
transport, food, community and commercial facilities to a peak-time population of 30, 
000 workers from more than 50 countries. The RM 40 million township was managed 
by a privatised consortium, which was awarded the project under a Build-Operate-
Transfer (BOT) arrangement.  
The Earthwork 
Earthworks are literally the groundwork for construction relay race; it frequently sets 
the pace of work to come. At KLIA construction of the earthworks platform assumed 
epic proportions because of the sheer size of site and the speed with which the job had 
to be completed. The airport site was unprepossessing territory, dense estates of 
thorny oil palm, rubber trees and swamp vegetation that merge into a seamless curtain 
of resistance. The first task was to hack an access road through the plantations to 
reach the construction site.  
 
Overnight, the sleepy hamlet of Sepang was rudely awakened from its blissful 
existence. The place was overrun by people and machines hitherto unknown to the 
simple rural folk working the estates or tending their patch of agricultural land. Dump 
trucks trundled across country roads while compactors and excavators rode on the 
back of prime movers heading towards the earthworks site. Enterprising villagers rose 
to the occasion and there was a rash of little business, especially eateries ranging from 
ramshackle take-aways to coffee shops. 
 
The earthworks platform comprised some 3500 acres hectares of lowland 
swamp of soft clays capped with thick layer of peat and high ground that was to be 
cut and used as fill. Planning down the higher elevation involved conventional 
practices such as soil investigation, cut and fill operation, preparing instrumentation to 
monitor soil profiles and performance, and the building drainage channels. 
 
The peat swamp, however, posed the biggest challenge. The platform over 
swampy areas received considerable attention since it would have a serious impact on 
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the progress and performance of the completed airport. Initially, the most effective 
design solution proposed involved the removal of all the peat and no more than 5 
metres of clay. Where the clay was thicker than 5 metres, million of vertical band 
drains were to be installed to squeeze out the water more quickly. This would speed 
up by about 90% soil settlement that would otherwise occur over hundreds of years. 
The final 10% of soil settlement was expected to occur gradually during the 
construction period. 
 
But thing changed. Competitive tendering for contracts resulted in significant 
reduction in costs, allowing KLIAB to examine other cost-effective design solutions. 
Eventually, it was decided to remove all the peat and clay. Solution 2 was a daunting 
task, involving excavation of up to 20 metres soft clay. Most difficult were the 
channels of very soft clay flows that oozed into extensive mudflows, causing 
equipment to become mired in them. Excavators, precariously perched on 
embankments pressed on, digging (and subsequently filling) into the waterlogged 
soils Dump trucks had difficulty gaining access to these sites. Finger roads supported 
by rafts of oil palm trunks were built using army techniques. This enables the trucks 
to move closer to the excavators that dug and dumped the soil. Truck then disposed 
their load at designated tips on the KLIA site. The dumping grounds are now the 
mounds along the perimeter roads, grassed and landscaped to support the ‘Airport in a 
forest; forest in an airport’ theme of KLIA. 
 
Material from the higher ground was used as fill and compacted to raise the 
earthworks platform in 250mm layers to the required level. However the thickness of 
the fill was up to 30 metres! The main advantage of solution 2 is that it eventually 
resulted in considerable time savings because there was no need to wait for the clay to 
consolidate.  
 
This proved desirable given the fast-track nature of the KLIA project, where 
every activity was time-driven. Earthwork was further complicated by the staggered 
scheduling of activities. Bulk earthworks for the main site comprised six packages, 
each with different deadlines. A package was further fine-tuned into a multitude of 
sections, so that the next wave of construction contractors could move in as each 




It was like several relay races held at the same time, with the next-in-line 
contractor anxiously waiting for the baton so he could run his stretch in the shortest 
possible time. This scheduling of work differed from the conventional scenario, where 
bulk earthworks have the entire site to themselves before construction begins. 
 
To meet deadlines, armies of excavators, compactors and dump trucks were 
utilised. The equipment was sourced from a bewildering number of Malaysian 
suppliers. Word has it that heavy equipment was plentiful as a result of the 
completion of another major transport infrastructure – the peninsular highway project 
(PLUS). Machines dotted the landscape, scurrying across the wide expanse of 
stripped ground like armies of ants. 
 
At the peak in mid-1994, more than 300 excavators and 1500 dump trucks worked 
through the nights. 130 million cubic metres of earth was removed, with more than a 
million removed in the first two years.  
Going for Green Project Concept 
KLIAB was acutely aware that airports have the potential to cause significant 
pollution if not carefully designed and constructed. While the Sepang site is located 
away from population centres, the landscape, topography, flora and fauna there would 
nonetheless be dramatically altered by the development. Every measure therefore had 
to be taken to reduce the impact of the airport construction and operations on the site 
and surrounding areas. And action was taken from the very start.  
 
 At the time the KLIA Master plan was being prepared in 1992, an 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Study was undertaken, in compliance with 
the Department of Environment (DOE) regulations. The comprehensive study 
examined the existing site and how airport development would impact on air quality, 
noise levels, land use, landscape, ecology, traffic and transport, infrastructure and 
utilities and the socio-economic standards of residents in the vicinity. 
 Also included were mitigation and abatement measures and a environmental 
management plan for the designated 25,000-acre airport site. The EIA identified the 
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need for environmental management at two stages namely construction and operation. 
Developer KLIAB responded by setting up the Health, Safety, Security and 
Environment Department to coordinate and implement the environmental 
management plan. It also appointed an independent company to conduct monthly 
environmental audits. 
 
 This move has been lauded by the DOE which acknowledged that KLIAB is 
the first large project developer to introduce a central coordinating body and 
environmental audits to ensure contractors observed legal DOE requirements and 
undertook appropriate abatement/mitigation measures. 
 
 The biggest challenge for the new department was to minimise the impact of 
construction activities on air quality, water quality, traffic management, soil 
conservation and waste disposal. Given the scale of the project, bulk earthworks 
caused the air quality index to nosedive. Water and sheeted trucks were widely used 
to suppress airborne dust emissions. 
As a control project, the 10x10 km site met the prerequisite buffer zone that reduced 
the residual impact of air pollution on surrounding residential areas. Waste soil 
removed for earthworks was deposited in designated sites that were subsequently 
landscaped. KLIAB also adopted several imaginative environmentally-friendly 
practices that have the potential to be benchmarked by other large infrastructural 
projects, both locally and regionally. The Construction Director of KLIAB, Dato’ Ir 
Hamzah Hassan said: 
‘Some of our initiatives include the appointment of an independent 
environmental auditor during construction; establishing an aircraft noise 
monitoring facility for all buildings and facilities; and a continuous and 
detailed study of bird strike hazards by migratory birds.’ 
Three balancing ponds were built to prevent flooding and sedimentation. They ensure 
that stream diversions do not result in flooding and backflow and that water 
discharged into the rivers is free of construction-generated pollutants. 
 
The removal of vast tracts of vegetation also resulted in turfing and 
landscaping to prevent soil erosion and flooding whilst enhancing the visual impact of 
the built area. DOE regulations require 20% of any developed area to be landscaped; 
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KLIA estimates as much as 35-40% of the built site has been reafforested. The task of 
creating an instant rainforest at the Passenger Terminal Complex fell on the shoulders 
of the Forest Research Institute of Malaysia (FRIM). In 1995, it set up a mock 
rainforest on the airport site as a control area to select species compatible with the 
airport environment. 
 
 KLIAB and FRIM had set up a mock forest at Sepang, where they spent 15 
months researching on trees above 5 metres that could survive the airport 
environment. All up, 300 trees have had a headstart of 15 years and a lifespan of 100 
years. There is a generous use of ferns, palms and shrubs to create the four layers that 
characterise rainforests: emergent trees, main canopy, secondary trees and the forest 
floor. Water elements such as running streams and a waterfall make the ‘forest in the 
airport’ a dynamic habitat. 
Balancing Ponds 
Three multi-purpose balancing ponds were built in the periphery of the construction 
site to reduce the impact of surface water pollution. The ponds are both siltation traps 
and flood-preventers, collecting sediment and run-off, especially during earthworks, 
which resulted in the extensive removal vegetation. They are also filtration units for 
water polluted by accidental spillage of oils, grease, fuels and asphalt plants. The 
filtered water is then released into the catchment area of Sungai Sepang Kecil. 
Waste water treatment plant 
Effluent from the Terminal Complex will be treated and recycled into water for 
sanitation and irrigation. The DCS/Co-generation plant uses natural gas, a green fuel, 
as the primary fuel to produce chilled water to condition all KLIA buildings. Waste 
steam, a by-product of the process, is used to generate electric back-up power supply 
for the airport. The use of the centralised cooling system also removes the need for 
each facility at KLIA to install, maintain and operate its own chillers and cooling 
towers, causing considerable savings in capital expenditure, energy and operational 
costs. 
KLIA uses computer technology to create a healthy and energy efficient 
indoor environment. Its Building Management System (TAMS), enables authorised 
users to adjust air conditioning and lighting levels from any computer terminal. The 
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airport also boasts one of the healthiest indoor air environments with the installation 
of electronic air cleaners and carbon dioxide sensors. The efficient filtration of 
circulating air has two benefits: it provides fresh, healthy air for those in the building; 
and it saves energy by keeping air conditioning coils clean. 
The New International Airport 
June 28, 1998, was the KLIA inaugurated date declaring the airport officially 
opened to commercial operation. Touted as one of the most architecturally beautiful 
and sophisticated airport in the world, the profoundness of this achievement would be 
more overwhelming if the following considerations are taken into account; 
 A green field 25 million passenger per annum 1st Phase airport development 
on a generally peat soil, palm oil plantation and secondary forest site, 
  Seven-year completion from initiation to site study and selection, Masterplan 
and Architectural design concept , engineering design, procurement, physical 
construction, testing and commissioning, and the crucial airport operational 
readiness and transfer exercise,  
 Two years into the project, a sudden fundamental shift in the project’s 
organisational and procurement approach was made – from a contractor-
driven design and build turnkey to a client-driven total project management 
approach, 
 205 different contract packages running concurrently on a 7850 acres 1st 
Phase development site, with 130 million metres of earth moved; two 1.1 km 
tunnel BHS connecting tunnel; 200,000 square metres of granite flooring; 
18,500 km fibre optic cables laid; 30,000 workers at peak from 50 different 
countries; to name a few, 
 52 months total construction including testing and commissioning and 
operational readiness and transfer from the old airport in Subang, 
 First ever airport to successfully develop, design and implement a fully 
integrated IT airport management system,  
 No major operational breakdown on opening day except a minor glitch on the 
baggage handling system (BHS), 
 From a submitted estimate of RM20 billion design and build turnkey contract 
without time completion guarantee, the project estimate was reduced to RM11 
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billion on the same scope with full commitment on time completion by KLIA 
Berhad – a newly setup Malaysian run Minister of Finance Inc company given 
the task to implement the project in late 1993. 
Ingredient for Project Success 
The major factor for the successful implementation of project management is that the 
project manager and team become focal point of integrative responsibility' (Kerzner, 
1995). In mega project especially, the diversity of the project types, organisational 
levels, and personnel and worker involved is as diverse as the project scope. 
 
The project manager must be able to exert interpersonal influence in order to 
lead the project team. The members of functional departments may be accustomed to 
a single reporting line in a hierarchical structure in a matrix organization, but the 
project manager coordinates the activities of the team members drawn from functional 
departments.  In general, the project manager's authority must be clearly well defined, 
particularly in matrix organization where the functional division managers often retain 
certain authority over the personnel temporarily assigned to a project. The project 
manager should encourage problem solving rather than role playing of team members 
drawn from various functional divisions. 
 
Some problems of interaction may arise initially when the team members are 
unfamiliar with their own roles on the project team. Many major issues in 
construction project require effective interventions by individuals, groups and 
organisations. The fundamental challenge is to enhance communication among 
individuals, groups and organizations.  Based on the experience of KLIA project 
Jamilus emphasized that: 
“The most difficult part in this project is managing people. I got used to having 
to handle such a costly project, but in managing people there is the element of 
unpredictability, even irrationality. For human management, there is no general 
rule” 
 
“Government servants are well-disciplined and trained to observe procedures 
and systems. Private sector consultants and contractors, on the other hand, are 
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focused on getting the job done quickly and willing to take risks, mopping up 
mistakes as they go along. Then, there are migrant workers, from different parts 
of the world and different socio-economic backgrounds. 
 
“KLIA gave them all the opportunity to interact and learn from each other. It 
certainly did for me…I believe that for everyone involved, this project must 
surely rate as an important testimonial of his/her ability to work in tandem 
with different disciplines and cultures to meet a common objective: to build a 
world class airport according to plan. This is the ‘soft’ factor that cannot be 
quantified. It should give us all the winning edge, especially relevant with 
increasing globalisation in our borderless world.” 
 
To optimize productivity of specialist skills, KLIAB’s organizational resources 
approach was to form a core team of highly experienced and committed professionals 
supported by external consultants. Local and foreign planning, design and supervisory 
consultants were engaged to provide relevant expertise and services. Together, they 
adapted existing or developed new management tools to monitor and control time, 
cost, quality, and more importantly, fostered a professional working culture and a 
unique spirit of partnership. 
 
With as many as 30,000 workers from more than 50 countries working at the peak 
of construction, cross-cultural communication was important. In the span of six years, 
KLIAB had moulded a unique working culture and environment that united these 
people into a well-disciplined and cohesive group working towards a common goal. 
According to Hussien and Karimin (2006), the biggest value proposition for project 
management, particularly in managing large-scale complex time bound projects 
relates to the way project organisation and the team members execute the following 
set of project implementation methodology: 
1. Communicating and managing expectations with clients, team members, and 
stakeholders more effectively. Many problems on a project can be avoided 
with proactive and multi-faceted communication. In addition, much of the 
conflict that arises on a project is not the result of a specific problem, but 
because of surprises. Standard methodologies always focus on formal and 
informal communication, which results in fewer surprises.    
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2. More focus on metrics and fact-based decision-making. One of the more 
sophisticated aspects of project management methodologies is that they 
provide guidance to make it easier to collect metrics (measures). Metrics give 
you information that helps you to determine how effective and efficient your 
team is performing and the level of the quality of your deliverables.   
3. Improved work environment. If the project is well planned and per forms 
accordingly the work environment improves tremendously. Clients will be 
more willing to provide additional support, project team members will take 
more ownership of the project, morale will be better, and the project team will 
behave with a greater sense of professionalism and self-confidence. 
4. Resolving problems more quickly. On many occasions, some team members 
spend too much time and energy dealing with problems because they do not 
know how to resolve the problems to begin with. Having a proactive issue 
management process helps ensure that problems are resolved as quickly as 
possible. 
5. Better solution “fit” the first time through better planning. Many projects 
experience problems because there is a gap between what the client expects 
and what the project team delivers. Using project management methodology 
results in better project planning, which gives the team and the sponsor an 
opportunity to make sure they are in agreement on the major deliverables 
produced by the project. 
6. Resolving future risk before problems occur. All project management 
methodologies have processes in place to identify and manage risks. Risk 
management will result in potential problems being identified and managed 
before the problems actually occur. 
Strategic Project Planning 
It is the task of the project planner/s together with the project team members to pierce 
through the maze and come out with the necessary strategies, plans, and system of 
control. The planners need to analyze the whole macro and micro project delivery 
processes in detail (see Figure 5 and Figure 6) to seek potential conflicts that constrain 
the delivery process. Interest of the project’s stakeholders need to be cross-checked 
and streamlined with the competing demands coming from the external and internal 
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project environment to determine and establish ‘what’ needs to be done in what 
manner and ‘how’ will it be done in order to meet the predetermined project 
objectives in time, quality, and cost. Appropriate project strategy vis-à-vis the 
project’s critical success factors needs to be established for an appropriate project 














Figure 5: Framework to control project complexity 
 
The essence of managing complexities is about control and the ability of the 
implementing organisation to increase effectiveness in its managerial span-of-control.  
When the risks are high, the key to risk management and control of the project 
performance is effective planning. This is to ensure plans that are put in place 
effectively streamline and offer quick responses to any conflicts and issues arising out 
of the competing demands from external and internal parties. 
The performance of managerial control over the project to meet project 
objectives and goals will be largely dependent on strategies formulated to control not 
just planned work activities duration, cost, and quality but also, manage complexities, 















Figure 6: Elements in Project Control 
 
Due to the different nature of work activities as the project undergoes different project 
phases, set of requirements for the five control elements also changes. The control 
processes of these five control elements need to be planned and structured to 
correspond to the requirements and complexity of work content and activities in each 
and sometimes overlapping phases. 
 
The planning process starts not just with the project scoping and the project 
technicalities but more importantly looks at the strategic element of the project. 
Failure to look at this aspect, particularly in managing complex job, will render 
inadequacy and ineffectiveness to the project organisation to respond and make timely 
decision on issues, complications, and conflicts that arises throughout project phases. 
 
Once the planning exercise is completed, project implementation plans which 
also includes the monitoring and control systems, must be effectively transmitted and 
communicated to the various organisations in the project team. These plans should 
adequately address the critical implementation considerations, as follows: 
 Project implementation strategies in architectural and engineering design 
concept and work approach; the most effective procurement and contractual 
approach; funding and cost management,  quality assurance and quality 
control implementation; most suitable project organisation structure; effective 
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monitoring and control system; vis-à-vis the established project critical 
success factors.  
 Master work implementation programme, schedules and work activities 
methodologies. 
 Authority level and decision-making structure and protocols. 
 Communication and information flow structure and protocols for the whole 
project organisation – includes document management. 
  Organisational, managerial and administrative procedures. 
  Risk management plan 
Conclusion 
It is important to be aware that by putting up a project management system and 
methodology will not necessarily lead to project performance if the project 
management culture within the project organisation and team member level of project 
management knowledge and practice is low and inadequate. Project success also has 
to do with the level of competency of individual team members in the ‘know-what’ 
(project management body of knowledge, disciplinary knowledge) and the ‘have 
what’ (experience-know how, humanistic/soft skills). 
 
The level of competency is very much dependent on the level of exposure and 
capability of the project manager and members in his project organisation (these are 
the know who) in utilizing the ‘know-what’ and ‘have what’ specific to the project 
external and internal environment requirements to match the project success metrics. 
In addition, both of these aspects of competency must at the same time be matched 
with the required level of competency in the various technical disciplinary fields to 
enable the right planning, problem-solving and decision-making.  
 
In the final analysis, the sum of the level of competencies of the individual 
team members and project management organisation in the ‘know what’ and the ‘have 
what’, and ‘know how’ of the technical disciplinary knowledge will ensure project 
issues are being address in a proactive, systematic and timely manner. When an 
organisation develops this project management working culture, one that is 
characterized with team-working, process and goal -orientated, discipline, problem-
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solving, and decision-making traits, the odds for a project to perform and achieve 
success will be very much increased. 
 
From the experiences of the KLIA project, several important aspects that need 
to be given serious effort to ensure that large-scale projects achieve the desired 
performance and success are the need for effective project management on both 
Client/Owner and Contractors organisation – knowledge, experience and competency; 
managing large-scale projects is about managing complexities – work content and 
work processes; strategic project planning is key to control and good leadership is 
vital for success. 
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This case presents the perspective of a Malaysian construction company, KLIA 
Premier Holding Berhad which was in the process of completing a mega project with 
very limited time. The project came into being in the late 1990s, to relieve the strain 
on the existing Sultan Abdul Aziz Shah Airport. KLIA is currently designed to handle 
around 25 million passengers and one million tonnes of cargo a year. It is to be 
developed in three phases, building up to a final capacity of 100 million passengers 
per annum. Only the first phase is under consideration here. The company had to 
confront with time constraint to complete and operate the mega scale project within 6 
years from point of decision to build-normal 10-12 years. At the beginning of the 
project was the company. To achieve these objectives, it was important for the 







This case was written to provide a detail story of a successful construction project. It 
could be used in a strategic management course. It gives student a chance to explore 
and understand on how decisions are made in project management in construction 
industry. 
This integrated case study aims 
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1. To examine the strategy used in construction project 
2. To identify the possible critical problem and dilemma of a company and how 
decision making are made in project management 
3. To identify conflict that may be faced by a project manager in handling a 
construction project 
4. To suggest and recommend the probable solutions or alternative actions 
5. To address the issues that may deter the construction project performance  
 
Case Leading Strategy 
1. The students should be familiar in the Malaysian construction industry. 
2. The class will be divided into groups of four to discuss the case 
3. The class discussion should be over two lecture sessions of at least 90 minutes 
duration 
4. The first lecture 
a. 10 minutes- The case brief by the facilitator 
b. 15 minutes- Individual reading (this can be done without if the case is 
given ahead of the class) 
c. 20 minutes- Group discussion 
d. 30 minutes- Class discussion raising issues and strategies for 
knowledge search 
e. 15 minutes- Summary and critique by facilitator 
5. The four groups will be given a ‘project’. The project will have various 
obstacles or problems that each of the groups needs to find a solution to. The 
‘project’ can be the same ‘project’ with different ways of solving the problem 
OR each group has different ‘project’ with different problems. 
6. Research- 1 week for research external to the classroom and preparation for 
presentation. 
7. The second lecture 
Role play – Each group will take turn in presenting their solution to the 
‘problematic project’ and the reasoning for the solution while the other 3 
groups act as the Board of Directors and evaluate the given solution based 





c) Time consumption 




1. Identify the issues faced by Malaysian construction industry. 
2. Identify new strategy implemented by Malaysian construction industry. 
3. How important leadership is in managing construction project? Could you 
recommend how construction industry in Malaysia can be better? 
4. A mega construction project such as the Kuala Lumpur International Airport 
project involved massive number of employees. How did the KLIAB manage 
to minimise behavioural problems amongst the employees with reference to 
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs? Give example of decisions made by KLIAB 
that suit with these theories. 
 
Suggested Answers 
1. Based on the case study, the issues faced by KLIAB 
i. The deadline - The urgency to have the airport built by 1998 required 
innovative strategies to manage the project.  
ii. The implementation of ISO 9000 - It was a great challenge for the 
KLIA Construction Management Team to implement the ISO quality 
system in a large project, which involved nearly 150 major contracts 
with more than 110 major contractors and 1600 interfaces between 
participants.  The QMS plan implemented in the KLIA project was 
referred to as Project Quality Plan (PQP).  The critical quality elements 
were: 1) management responsibility; 2) quality planning; 3) resources 
management; 4) process control; 5) inspection and testing; 6) quality 
recording; 7) auditing; and 8) data analysis and report.   
iii.  Relocating communities - Relocating communities is not easy. KLIAB 
sought the assistance of the Aborigines’ Affairs Department (Jabatan 
Hal Ehwal Orang Asli) to make their relocation as painless as possible. 
To ensure that the orang asli would enjoy a better life in their new 
village, the Federal Government had to work through the traditional 
orang asli hierarchy and took several measures. They were 
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compensated for their loss of land, with some families receiving up to 
RM100, 000. To help them spend their compensation wisely, the 
Aborigines; Affair Department conducted meetings (through their 
headman) on how to invest their money. 
iv. Third is the transient worker - Remote construction sites are notorious 
for hastily built slum settlements of kongsis mushrooming overnight. 
The crammed living quarters often supports more bodies per square 
meter than Wembley Stadium at the FA Cup final. Coupled with the 
fact they often do not have piped water, electricity and suffer from 
badly maintained communal facilities, they health hazards waiting to 
explode. Cross-culture interactions resulted in contradicting work 
culture, and language barrier posed many unavoidable problems.    
v. The earthwork - Earthworks are literally the groundwork for 
construction relay race; it frequently sets the pace of work to come. At 
KLIA construction of the earthworks platform assumed epic 
proportions because of the sheer size of site and the speed with which 
the job had to be completed. The airport site was unprepossessing 
territory, dense estates of thorny oil palm, rubber trees and swamp 
vegetation that merge into a seamless curtain of resistance. 
 
2. Example of new strategy implemented by KLIAB 
- Used a sound procurement strategy that prioritised fast-track methods. The 
foundation for fast-tracking was laid by the Engineering Design Contract, and 
out of this grew the KLIA Master Implementation Programme, the cornerstone 
of the procurement strategy, for the full development of KLIA. The time-
driven Master Implementation Programme organised all construction activities 
into a systematic framework of realistic timelines. 
- KLIA’s procurement strategy revolved around a selective combination of fast 
track design-and-build and conventional fast-track methods.  
- The work contracts were broken into packages according to their respective 
areas. Three types of contracts were awarded: 
 Fast track conventional tenders 
 Fast track design and build tenders 
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 Conventional tenders 
- For the fast-track design and build and conventional contracts, tenders were 
invited based on preliminary engineering and architectural designs, with 
enough information for contractors to tender. Successful contractors were then 
issued just-in-time working drawing during the construction stage. Competitive 
tendering and just-in-time fast tracking approach eventually saved KLIAB a 
great deal of time in getting contractors to begin work on site. 
 
3. Project leadership is a very important skill and is very crucial to the success of 
a project. Project leadership is about deciding on the right project, knowing the 
project priorities and knowing how to create value.  
 
From the experiences of the KLIA project, several important aspects that need 
to be given serious effort to ensure that large-scale projects achieve the desired 
performance and success are:- 
- the need for effective project management on both Client/Owner and 
Contractors organization knowledge, experience and competency;  
- managing large-scale projects is about managing complexities work 
content and work processes 
- strategic project planning is key to control and good leadership is vital 
for success. 
 
The leader should have a good sense on how the environment changes and is 
responsible in adapting his construction firm to the changing environment. The 
leader is more concerned with the overall strategy of the project and is focused 
on the external environment in which the project operates. Hence, the project 
manager, as a leader must be able to exert interpersonal influence in order to 
lead the project team. The members of functional departments may be 
accustomed to a single reporting line in a hierarchical structure in a matrix 
organization, but the project manager coordinates the activities of the team 
members drawn from functional departments.  In general, the project manager's 
authority must be clearly well defined, particularly in matrix organization 
where the functional division managers often retain certain authority over the 




encourage problem solving rather than role playing of team members drawn 
from various functional divisions. 
 
1.  Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs: The needs are the basics that all human must 
have in order to live and survive. These basic needs are also called “deficiency 
needs” because if they are not met by an individual, then that person will strive 
to make up the deficiency. These needs are normally listed in a hierarchical 
order in the form of a pyramid to show that the basic needs (bottom ones) must 















Figure 1: Maslow Hierarchy of Needs 
 
8. Self-transcendence - a transegoic (see Note below) level that emphasizes 
visionary intuition, altruism, and unity consciousness. 
7. Self-actualization - knows exactly who you are, where you are going, and 
what you want to accomplish. A state of well-being. 
6. Aesthetic - to do things not simply for the outcome but because it's the 
reason you are here on earth - at peace, more curious about the inner workings 
of all things. 
5. Cognitive - to be free of the good opinion of others, learning for learning 
alone, contribute knowledge. 
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4. Esteem - feeling of moving up in world, recognition, few doubts about self. 
3. Belongingness and love - belong to a group, close friends to confide with. 
2. Safety - feels free from immediate danger. 
1. Physiological - food, water, shelter, sex. 
 
Examples from the case study 
  
1. During the early construction stage of the KLIA, the migrant workers live 
in a hastily built slum settlements of kongsis mushrooming overnight. The 
crammed living quarters often supports more bodies per square meter than 
Wembley Stadium at the FA Cup final. Coupled with the fact they often do 
not have piped water, electricity and suffer from badly maintained 
communal facilities, they health hazards waiting to explode. Cross-culture 
interactions resulted in contradicting work culture, and language barrier 
posed many unavoidable problems. This did not comply with the most 
basic physiological needs of the workers according to Maslow’s Hierarchy 
of Needs. 
To overcome this problem, KLIAB decided to build a township on a 
40-acre site at the edge of the airport where migrant workers could live and 
work close to the 33 work sites scattered across 25,000 acres. A well-
planned town catering to the needs of the KLIA workforce, particularly, 
manual staff, was considered important in helping alleviate many of the 
social and health problems associated with kongsis and shanty towns the 
world over. The town was built in 1995. It provided housing, transport, 
food, community and commercial facilities to a peak-time population of 
30, 000 workers from more than 50 countries. With basic needs being 
fulfilled, the construction projects were able to run smoothly without any 
major problems. 
 
2. The site identified for KLIA comprised a few sleepy settlements lost 
amidst rolling hills of rubber and palm oil plantations. A small community 
of 85 orang asli (aborigines) families was living there. They were mainly 
smallholders cultivating rubber, durians and other tropical fruits on their 
891-acre settlement. They had to be moved. However relocating 
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communities is not easy. KLIAB sought the assistance of the Aborigines’ 
Affairs Department (Jabatan Hal Ehwal Orang Asli) to make their 
relocation as painless as possible. 
To ensure that the orang asli would enjoy a better life in their new 
village, the Federal Government had to work through the traditional orang 
asli hierarchy and took several measures. They were compensated for their 
loss of land, with some families receiving up to RM100, 000. To help them 
spend their compensation wisely, the Aborigines; Affair Department 
conducted meetings (through their headman) on how to invest their money. 
 
